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Introduction 
The explosion on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig on April 20, 
2010, resulted in the spill of more than four million barrels of oil into 
the Gulf of Mexico.1 The disaster was a result of human agency2 and 
caused extensive damage to the economy of the Gulf states, the 
ecosystem, and the property of businesses and individuals in the areas 
 
1. Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & 
Offshore Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and 
the Future of Offshore Drilling, at vi (Jan. 2011).  
2. Id. at vii (“The explosive loss of the Macondo well could have been 
prevented. The immediate causes of the Macondo well blowout can be 
traced to a series of identifiable mistakes made by BP, Halliburton, and 
Transocean that reveal such systematic failures in risk management that 
they place in doubt the safety culture of the entire industry.”). Both the 
federal and state governments were also partially responsible for 
“fail[ing] to anticipate and prevent [the] catastrophe, and fail[ing] again 
to be prepared to respond to it.” Id. at ix.  
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affected.3 President Obama called the spill “the worst environmental 
disaster America has ever faced,”4 and the oil affected approximately 
650 miles of the Gulf Coast, with Louisiana being hit the hardest.5  
This Note focuses on the tax treatment of casualty losses6 to 
individuals affected by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, as well as 
future oil spills and contamination disasters, under section 165(c)(3) 
of the Internal Revenue Code. Code section 165(c)(3) covers “casualty 
losses”—losses not connected with a trade or business or a project 
entered into for a profit and that arise from “fire, storm, shipwreck, or 
other casualty.”7 It is unclear whether section 165(c)(3) applies in the 
oil spill context, but this Note advocates that such spills should be 
treated as an “other casualty.”8 Utilizing the Code in a modified way 
to compensate victims of such disasters is a superior approach to the 
current framework for compensating victims of casualty losses stem-
ming from oil spills. The current approach applies a combination of 
strict applications of section 165(c)(3), claims under the Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990 (OPA),9 private claims processes set up by tortfeasor oil 
companies, and private causes of action by individuals and businesses 
against those oil companies. This Note argues that this current frame-
work is disjointed, inefficient, and ought to be streamlined, and it 
suggests an alternative to the current approach: IRS subrogation with 
a removal of section 165(h) floors and an adoption of the Code section 
165(i) election, through a modified understanding and application of 
Code section 165(c)(3), particularly as it pertains to the Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford 
Act)10 and the OPA.   
3. Id. at vi (“The costs from this one industrial accident are not yet fully 
counted, but it is already clear that the impacts on the region’s natural 
systems and people were enormous, and that economic losses total tens 
of billions of dollars.”).  
4. Id. at 173. Interestingly, however, the President did not invoke the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. 
5. Id. 
6. See I.R.C. § 165(a) (2006) (“General rule.—There shall be allowed as a 
deduction any loss sustained during the taxable year and not 
compensated for by insurance or otherwise.”). 
7. I.R.C. § 165(c) (“In the case of an individual, the deduction . . . shall be 
limited to . . . losses of property not connected with a trade or business 
or a transaction entered into for profit, if such losses arise from fire, 
storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.”). 
8. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3). 
9. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified 
as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 and in scattered sections of other 
titles).  
10. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207 (2006). 
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Part I discusses the mechanics of Code section 165(c)(3). It 
explains the judicial history of this section of the Code, including the 
standard statutory interpretation approach that courts have used in 
light of the limited legislative history surrounding this provision. It also 
explains how casualty loss deductions are calculated, covering the 
burden of proof, the floors involved in calculating a casualty loss, and 
the social and political reasons for these limitations. It goes on to 
examine the meaning of this section of the Code itself, applying the rule 
of ejusdem generis (“of the same kind”) to explore whether property 
damage caused by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill can or should be 
treated as a casualty loss, ultimately arguing that it should be treated 
as such. It also discusses the Tax Benefit Rule, a doctrine limiting 
casualty loss deductions to those “not compensated by insurance or 
otherwise.”11 The Rule requires individuals who take a casualty loss 
deduction and subsequently make a recovery for that loss to count that 
recovery in their income for the year in which they receive the recovery, 
potentially causing major financial hardship to individuals. 
Part II identifies and analyzes the circuit split between the Courts 
of Appeal for the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits regarding whether 
application of section 165(c)(3) requires physical damage to the 
property, or whether general decline in property value suffices. Oil 
spills occupy a unique niche within the broader category of casualty 
losses because publicity surrounding oil spills contributes to a broad 
decline in property values, regardless of whether a property was 
directly damaged or contaminated by the spill. To allow for casualty 
loss recovery due to a general decline in value of surrounding 
properties, provisions must be put in place to allow for widespread 
recovery and to prevent inequitable outcomes due to the jurisdiction 
in which the taxpayer resides. By streamlining the framework for 
recovering from oil spills, the federal government could bypass the 
circuit split on general property value decline and adopt the Eleventh 
Circuit’s position as announced in Finkbohner v. United States,12 at 
least in the oil spill context. 
Part III identifies three current approaches to compensating oil 
spill victims: the OPA, the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF), and 
private causes of action in tort and insurance. It identifies shortcom-
ings in each of these avenues of recovery, focusing on the burdens and 
tradeoffs taxpayers face in the wake of casualty losses. It suggests 
that the current infrastructure for dealing with casualty losses is inef-
ficient and results in unnecessary hardships for taxpayers and argues 
 
11. I.R.C. § 165(a) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss 
sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance 
or otherwise.” (emphasis added)). 
12. Finkbohner v. United States, 788 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1986). 
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that there ought to be a more streamlined, uniform system of 
recovery for oil spill victims with casualty losses.  
Part IV discusses the Stafford Act and Code section 165(i)(1),13 
which makes special provisions for individuals claiming casualty loss 
deductions when the President of the United States invokes the 
Stafford Act. This Part also discusses legislation Congress enacted to 
bolster the benefits of the Stafford Act in response to Hurricane 
Katrina, allowing for elimination of the floors and ceilings associated 
with casualty loss deductions. It explains when and how the Stafford 
Act is implemented in response to natural disasters and examines the 
political and social justifications for the allowances the Stafford Act 
provides for victims of natural disasters. Further, it analyzes 
legislative approaches that the federal government has taken in the 
past, in conjunction with an invocation of the Stafford Act, to adjust 
the floors of Code section 165(h)14 to allow more widespread taxpayer 
recovery. It explains why President Obama did not invoke the 
Stafford Act in response to this disaster by offering a comparative 
analysis of the Presidential response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill off 
the coast of Alaska in 1989. An invocation of the Stafford Act would 
have been an inappropriate presidential response to the Deepwater 
Horizon incident, given the restrictions, mechanics, and justifications 
of the Stafford Act, particularly because this and other oil spills are 
almost always the result of human agency. But the direct and indirect 
damages suffered by victims in oil spills are so analogous to those 
suffered by the victims of natural disasters that, at the very least, the 
tax allowances extended by an invocation of the Stafford Act ought to 
be extended to the victims of oil spills. 
Finally, Part V identifies a solution for the shortcomings of the 
current methods of recovery for individual taxpayers suffering prop-
 
13. I.R.C. § 165(i)(1) (“[A]ny loss occurring in a disaster area . . . may, at 
the election of the taxpayer, be taken into account for the taxable year 
immediately preceding the taxable year in which the disaster oc-
curred.”); I.R.C. § 165(k) (describing the procedure for treatment as a 
disaster a loss where a taxpayer is ordered to relocate or demolish his or 
her residence because of a Stafford Act disaster declaration). 
14. I.R.C. § 165(h)(1)–(2) (“Treatment of casualty gains and losses.—(1) 
$100 limitation per casualty.—Any loss of an individual described in 
subsection (c)(3) shall be allowed only to the extent that the amount of 
the loss to such individual arising from each casualty, or from each 
theft, exceeds $500 ($100 for taxable years beginning after December 31, 
2009). (2) Net casualty loss allowed only to the extent it exceeds 10 
percent of adjusted gross income.—(A) In general.—If the personal 
casualty losses for any taxable year exceed the personal casualty gains 
for such taxable year, such losses shall be allowed for the taxable year 
only to the extent of the sum of—(i) the amount of the personal 
casualty gains for the taxable year, plus (ii) so much of such excess as 
exceeds 10 percent of the adjusted gross income of the individual.”).  
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erty damage in this or future oil spills, drawing on an approach 
recommended by another scholar:15 IRS subrogation and a removal of 
the Code section 165(h) floors.16 Instead of taxpayers individually 
filling claims with the BP Oil Spill Fund, this Note proposes that the 
Code section 165(h)17 floors be eliminated in the case of an oil spill, 
allowing everyone to deduct casualty losses to property. Then, the 
IRS can subrogate those claims and recover from the BP Oil Fund or 
other funds created by section 2715 of the OPA,18 thereby avoiding 
lost tax revenue. This approach creates an equitable remedy for 
taxpayers, lowers transaction costs for all parties involved, and would 
be easy to implement, especially given the federal government’s use of 
subrogation in other contexts. 
I. Casualty Loss Deductions for Individuals: The 
Administrative Limitations of Applying I.R.C. § 165(c) 
to the Victims of Oil Spills.  
Code section 165 provides as a general rule that “any loss 
sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by 
insurance or otherwise” may be deducted as a loss, with limitations 
set by its subsections.19 Section 165 has been called a “free partial 
insurance scheme.”20 Justifications for allowing a casualty loss deduc-
tion include ensuring that the income tax reflects a taxpayer’s ability 
to pay and ensuring that the income tax equals consumption plus 
savings, since “amounts lost to casualties are neither consumed by the 
taxpayer . . . nor saved.”21  
There is little legislative history about the meaning of “casualty” 
as contemplated in section 165(c), and its parameters “have evolved 
 
15. Andrew Blair-Stanek, Using Insurance Law and Policy to Interpret the 
Tax Code’s Loss and Medical Expense Provisions, 26 Yale L. & Pol’y 
Rev. 309, 343–44 (2007). 
16. I.R.C. § 165(h)(1)–(2).  
17. Id. 
18. 33 U.S.C. § 2715(a) (2006) (“Any person, including the Fund, who pays 
compensation pursuant to this Act to any claimant for removal costs or 
damages shall be subrogated to all rights, claims, and causes of action 
that the claimant has under any other law.”). 
19. I.R.C. § 165(a).  
20. Blair-Stanek, supra note 15, at 310–11 (“The taxpayer’s co-pay amounts 
to 100% minus the marginal tax rate, with deductibles (in the insurance 
sense of the word) applying to individual taxpayers in some 
situations.”). 
21. Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Federal Income 
Taxation of Individuals ¶ 24.01 (3d ed. 2013 cum. supp. no. 1).  
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judicially.”22 Courts have interpreted casualty losses to individuals 
under section 165(c)(3) to require an element of suddenness, unusual-
ness, unexpectedness, or some combination of the three.23 Additionally, 
casualty losses are subject to two major statutory monetary limita-
tions. First, under section 165(h)(1), each loss must exceed $100.24 
Second, under section 165(h)(2), a net casualty loss is allowed “only 
to the extent it exceeds 10 percent of adjusted gross income 
(‘AGI’).”25 In some disaster situations, these floors and other 
statutory barriers to recovery from casualty losses are lifted, either 
under a specific provision of the Code26 or by legislative mandate.27 
This provision of the Code has been called “free insurance,”28 and 
has been criticized for discouraging people from purchasing property 
insurance because of the benefits associated with claiming a 
deduction.29 But the 10 percent AGI “floor” helps mitigate this moral 
hazard effect by preventing claims for minimal losses.  
 
22. Maher v. Comm’r, 76 T.C. 593, 596 (1981). 
23. See, e.g., id. at 598 (requiring that an event be “sudden, unusual, or 
unexpected” (quoting Burns v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 203, 210 
(N.D. Ohio 1959), aff’d per curiam, 284 F.2d 436 (6th Cir. 1960))); 
Appleman v. United States, 338 F.2d 729, 730–31 (1964) (“Among 
characteristics of the specific casualties enumerated in the section are 
suddenness and unforeseeability of the occurrence. Fire and shipwreck 
are undesigned, sudden, and unexpected events. While storms are to a 
degree predictable the factors of their violence and the particular site of 
loss or damage are uncertain.”). 
24. I.R.C. § 165(h)(1). 
25. I.R.C. § 165(h)(2). For example, if a taxpayer has an adjusted gross 
income (AGI) of $50,000 and sustains a loss valued at $6,000, that 
taxpayer is entitled to report the casualty loss on his income tax return: 
$6,000 less $100 is $5,900; 10 percent of $50,000 is $5,000; $5,900 
exceeds $5,000 by $900, so $900 is the amount of the deduction. 
26. E.g., I.R.C. § 165(k) (offering special casualty loss deduction treatment 
when a taxpayer is “ordered to demolish or relocate residence in disaster 
area because of disaster”).  
27. Rev. Proc. 2006-32, 2006-28 I.R.B. 61 (providing safe harbor methods 
for taxpayers to use in determining the amount of casualty losses due to 
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, and eliminating the $100 and 10 
percent of AGI floors for casualty losses as a result of those hurricanes).  
28. William A. Klein et al., Federal Income Taxation 355–56 (15th 
ed. 2009) (“If [a lawyer deducting a $10,000 loss] is in the 35 percent tax 
bracket, the deduction would save him $3,500 in taxes, thus reducing his 
after-tax loss to $6,500. It therefore has the same economic effect on him 
as . . . insurance with no deductible and a 65 percent ‘co-payment’ . . . . 
In cases where the deduction is available, therefore, it discourages people 
from purchasing insurance . . . .”). 
29. Id. at 356 (explaining that a taxpayer receiving a casualty loss 
deduction for a personal loss would receive this so-called free insurance 
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In assessing whether a loss is deductible under section 165(c)(3), 
the burden is on the taxpayer to prove that the loss is, in fact, a 
casualty loss.30 Evaluation of whether the complete or partial 
destruction of property constitutes a casualty loss requires an 
application of the ejusdem generis rule:  
Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis it is necessary to define 
the word ‘casualty’ in connection with the words ‘fires, storms, 
shipwreck’ immediately preceding it. By the rule of ejusdem 
generis, where general words follow the enumeration of 
particular classes of things, the general words should be 
construed as applicable only to those of the same general nature 
or class as those enumerated. The rule is based on the reason 
that, if the Legislature had intended the general words to be 
used in their unrestricted sense, there would have been no 
mention of the particular classes.31 
A casualty loss may be the result of human agency. For example, 
in Shearer v. Anderson,32 the Second Circuit held that a car accident 
that was “not caused by the willful act or neglect of the owner” was 
“analogous to a shipwreck,” and allowed a casualty loss deduction, 
admitting that it was unclear whether the act was caused by faulty 
driving on an icy road or the freezing of the car’s motor.33 
It is common knowledge that oil companies are integral to the 
Gulf states’ economies, and that drilling and refining are widespread 
practices in and around the Gulf of Mexico. Property owners in the 
Gulf states are aware of oil drilling and refining activity on, near, or 
in the vicinity of their property: being “on notice” in this way might 
weigh against a finding that the Deepwater Horizon oil spill was 
“unexpected.” But even if property owners are on notice of man-
made, abnormally dangerous activities near their property, they are 
entitled to report casualty losses in the event of an unexpected 
 
“without paying an arm’s-length premium”—a true economic benefit, 
since personal insurance premiums are themselves not deductible).  
30. See, e.g., Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933) (“[The 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s] ruling has the support of a 
presumption of correctness, and the petitioner has the burden of proving 
it to be wrong.”). 
31. Keenan v. Bowers, 91 F. Supp. 771, 774 (E.D.S.C. 1950) (internal 
citation omitted); see also Lyman v. Comm’r, 83 F.2d 811, 813 (1st Cir. 
1936) (“[W]here words of a particular or specific meaning are followed 
by general words, the general words are construed to apply only to 
persons or conditions of the same general kind as those specifically 
mentioned, unless there are other provisions clearly indicating that the 
rule is not applicable.”).  
32. Shearer v. Anderson, 16 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1927).  
33. Id. at 996–97.  
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accident or disaster connected to that abnormally dangerous 
activity.34  
In Durden v. Commissioner, taxpayers’ residences were located 
within a mile of a quarry that engaged in heavy blasting.35 A “very 
unusual blast, heavier than a normal charge”36 cracked the 
foundations, walls, dormer windows, plastering, and basements of 
several homes. The court noted that the “damage was caused by the 
blast . . . [and] not . . . any other form or process of gradual 
deterioration.”37 Furthermore, the court determined that even though 
the blast originated from an act of human agency, “a proper definition 
of the term casualty does not exclude the intervention of human 
agency, such as involved in setting off the blast involved in this case, 
and the prime element is that of suddenness as opposed to some 
gradually increasing result.”38 The court emphasized that it was the 
suddenness and unexpectedness of the event causing the damage that 
qualified it as a deductible casualty loss. The court also indicated that 
even though the taxpayers knew the blasting was taking place nearby, 
it did not automatically follow that they had assumed the risk. 
One important caveat in Durden is that the taxpayers had 
secured a promise from the blasting company that “no unusual 
blasting would be done.”39 This separate agreement could distinguish 
the Durden victims from the victims of the Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill. Although the United States Mineral Management Service 
(MMS) regulates Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Operations 
(OCS) to try to minimize environmental impact and avoid and limit 
incidents like the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, MMS reported on June 
17, 2009, that 1,443 offshore drilling “incidents” occurred between 
2001 and 2007, including “41 fatalities, 302 injuries, 10 losses of well 
control, 11 collisions, 476 fires, 356 pollution events, and 224 crane 
and other lifting events.”40 Thus, in addition to being on notice that 
oil drilling and refining activities occur routinely near their property, 
Gulf state residents have MMS statistics and data showing that 
accidents are a routine part of the industry. The MMS reported that 
“[t]he majority of incidents occurring in the OCS were related to 
 
34. Durden v. Comm’r, 3 T.C. 1, 4 (1944).  
35. Id.  
36. Id. at 2.  
37. Id. at 3.  
38. Id. at 4.  
39. Id. 
40. Safety and Environmental Management Systems for Outer Continental 
Shelf Oil and Gas Operations, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,639, 28,642 (proposed 
June 17, 2009) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250). 
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operational and maintenance procedures or human error.”41 Given the 
type of notice that the MMS has given to Gulf state property owners, 
it is unclear whether oil spills fall within the U.S. Tax Court’s holding 
in Durden. The persistent question is how unexpected is “unexpected 
enough” to constitute a casualty.  
It is also unclear whether damage to property suffered much later, 
or outside the immediate vicinity of the Deepwater Horizon accident, 
would qualify as casualty losses, and if so, what limits would apply. In 
Pugh v. Commissioner, the United States Board of Tax Appeals 
(B.T.A.) held that a diminution in value of farmland contaminated by 
seeping oil and saltwater from oil wells on the property did not 
constitute a casualty loss.42 At least one commentator has suggested 
that the B.T.A. denied the deduction because “pollution occurring 
over a long period of time is not a sudden enough event for a casualty 
loss.”43 In Lloyd’s Leasing Ltd. v. Conoco, a case that was not tried 
under tax principles but rather under tort law, the Fifth Circuit held 
that an oil company was not liable for damage from an oil spill when 
oil spread seventy miles from the location of a grounded tanker.44 The 
court found that although the company “might reasonably anticipate 
that the oil would probably wash ashore somewhere, it had no reason 
to have anticipated that the oil would probably wash ashore in a 
heavily populated area and then be tracked into businesses and 
homes.”45 This troubling result indicates that there could be similar 
barriers to recovery in the context of the Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill—either to individual claims against BP, or to successfully 
receiving deductions under section 165(c)(3). 
Section 165(a) explicitly provides that casualty losses are only 
deductible to the extent that they “are not compensated for by 
insurance or otherwise.”46 If compensation for the loss is received 
during the year that the loss is deducted, the calculus is easy, and the 
compensation is simply subtracted from the amount to be deducted. If 
a taxpayer is not compensated in the year of the deduction, but 
anticipates that he will be, he must subtract the anticipated amount 
of compensation from the amount he deducts for the casualty loss. On 
the other hand, if there is “no reasonable prospect of recovery, the 
entire loss is taken into account when sustained; and any unsuspected 
 
41. Id. 
42. Pugh v. Comm’r, 17 B.T.A. 429 (1929). 
43. Thomas H. Steele, The Tax Consequences of the Ownership and 
Cleanup of Environmentally Contaminated Properties, 26 Real Prop. 
Prob. & Tr. J. 655, 658 (1991). 
44. Lloyd’s Leasing Ltd. v. Conoco, 868 F.2d 1447, 1449–50 (5th Cir. 1989). 
45.  Id. at 1449. 
46. I.R.C. § 165(a) (2006). 
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subsequent recovery is taken into income when received, subject to 
the tax benefit doctrine.”47  
In Perry v. United States, the court justified the Tax Benefit 
Rule, holding that it “would be inequitable for the taxpayer to reduce 
his taxes for prior years on account of the [deductions], and not to 
pay taxes on them when he got them back. This . . . rule . . . is based 
altogether on equitable considerations.”48 But the tax consequences of 
the timing of the compensation can potentially be rather stark: if a 
taxpayer is compensated for an item he deducted in a previous year, 
and that compensation “occurs in a high income year . . . the 
progressive tax rate structure is likely to exact a higher toll than if 
the taxpayer had foregone the original deduction so that the later 
recovery would be a return of capital, and therefore not taxable.”49 If 
taxpayers do not know when, whether, or how much they will be 
compensated for their casualty losses, they could very well become 
financial victims a second time, due to their use of a provision in the 
Code designed to help them. 
The existing jurisprudence on casualty losses does not provide a 
conclusive determination as to whether an oil spill like the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster would constitute a casualty loss. The IRS has, 
however, issued guidelines to victims of the Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill indicating that it will honor casualty loss deductions associated 
with this disaster as long as they fit within the standard requirements 
for casualty losses.50 It is unclear whether this allowance is being made 
based on a strict application of the Code, or whether it is a decision 
the IRS made based on public policy. Even if this allowance is based 
on an application of the Code, the opportunities for widespread 
recovery are limited because the President did not invoke the Stafford 
Act, and because there are no guidelines about when the property 
damage must have occurred. Additionally, the other available avenues 
of recovery, including the OPA, GCCF, and insurance do not 
 
47. McMahon & Zelenak, supra note 21, ¶ 24.04[2]. 
48. Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270, 271 (Ct. Cl. 1958); see also 
John G. Corlew, The Tax Benefit Rule, Claim of Right Restorations, 
and Annual Accounting: A Cure for the Inconsistencies, 21 Vand. L. 
Rev. 995, 999 (1967) (noting that the tax benefit rule is an equitable 
doctrine (citing Perry, 160 F. Supp. at 271)). 
49. Corlew, supra note 48, at 995. 
50. See, e.g., IRS, Gulf Oil Spill: Questions and Answers 2 (2010), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4873a.pdf (“A taxpayer 
may be able to claim a casualty loss deduction if the payments . . . the 
taxpayer receives or reasonably expects to receive, are less than the 
taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the property.”); IRS, Overview and 
Guidance for Assisting Taxpayers Impacted by the Gulf Oil 
Spill 10 (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4906.pdf 
(same). 
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guarantee uniform odds of recovery, which could result in detrimental 
financial consequences due to the Tax Benefit Rule. The limitations of 
the existing availability of casualty loss deductions for the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster and other oil spills weighs in favor of developing a 
more widespread, equitable recovery system for oil spill victims.  
II. Casualty Losses and General Decline in Property 
Value: An Argument in Favor of Adopting the 
Eleventh Circuit’s Approach to Casualty Losses for 
Oil Spill Victims  
In an August 2010 article, economist Mark Fleming said, in 
relation to Gulf state property values following the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill, “It’s not only about whether the oil arrives . . . . 
There’s evidence [that] something as catastrophic as this scares people 
away.”51 The same article reported that coastal homes along the Gulf 
of Mexico “may lose as much as $56,000 each in value as buyers shun 
areas marred by the worst oil spill in U.S. history . . . .”52 Even 
Kenneth Feinberg, administrator of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, 
admitted that the spill caused declines in property value, saying, 
“There’s no question that the property value has diminished as a 
result of the spill . . . .”53 But, he qualified, “[t]hat doesn’t mean that 
every property is entitled to compensation.”54 Part of the problem 
with calculating declines in property values in the Gulf states is that, 
in the wake of the housing bubble, Florida in particular was hit very 
hard with plummeting property values. The same article reports that 
in 2010, Florida had “the third-highest rate of foreclosure filings in 
the nation, behind Nevada and Arizona . . . .”55 But CoreLogic, a real 
estate data firm that conducted a property value study on the 
affected area, took this into account in its study. While the OPA 
allows for compensation based on a decline in property value,56 those 
assessments are made on a case-by-case basis, and Kenneth Feinberg 
himself said that not every property owner would be entitled to a 
recovery for a decline in his property’s value.  
 
51. John Gittelsohn, BP Spill May Cost Gulf Coast Homes $56,000 Apiece 
in Value, Bloomberg (Aug. 2, 2010, 12:01 AM), available at http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-02/gulf-coast-homes-to-lose-up-to-
56-000-in-value-as-bp-spill-spoils-beaches.html. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id.  
55. Id. 
56. See discussion infra Part III.A (discussing the OPA).  
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In Finkbohner v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit showed a 
willingness to allow casualty loss deductions for a decline in property 
value even when the taxpayer’s property itself incurred no physical 
damage.57 This is a boon to Florida taxpayers who might not have 
suffered contamination or other damage to their property but who 
nonetheless suffered an economic loss from a drop in property value. 
But the Ninth Circuit disagrees with the Eleventh Circuit over 
whether there is a requirement of actual physical damage for a section 
165(c)(3) casualty loss, or alternatively whether permanent 
diminution in property value even without physical damage suffices. 
Florida taxpayers are covered for now, but Deepwater Horizon victims 
in other circuits might not fare so well; and if the Supreme Court 
weighs in, Florida’s luck might run out, too. It is clear that the 
Deepwater Horizon spill has created not only direct losses in value 
due to physical damage to property, but also indirect losses in 
property value due to immediate and lingering public concern about 
the environmental impact of the disaster. Neither the GCCF nor the 
federal courts have been able to arrive at a uniform way of 
compensating victims whose property value declined as part of the 
aggregate decline in value due to the disaster. This results in 
disparate treatment of victims, and this disparity cries out for an 
official resolution.  
In Finkbohner, the Eleventh Circuit held that when a disaster 
results in “changes in the neighborhood . . . that will outlast the fresh 
recollection of disaster,” and not merely temporary buyer resistance, a 
property owner can deduct the permanent decline in property value 
even if his property did not itself sustain physical damage.58 The 
taxpayer’s home was situated on a cul-de-sac with eleven other 
houses, and after a flood, seven of those houses had to be demolished 
because of flood damage, leaving the taxpayer’s home “in a lonesome 
neighborhood, more exposed to crime, and with much diminished 
privacy.”59 The court held that although it would not allow a casualty 
loss deduction for temporary buyer resistance, the situation in this 
case was distinguishable because of the permanent changes to the 
neighborhood that would “outlast the fresh recollection of disaster,” 
and allowed the deduction.60  
In a 1994 California memorandum opinion, the U.S. Tax Court 
indicated that it would allow a section 165(c)(3) deduction for a 
decline in the value of a taxpayer’s home in California due to the 
 
57. Finkbohner v. United States, 788 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1986). 
58. Id. at 727.  
59. Id. at 724.  
60. Id. at 727.  
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destruction of trees on adjacent lots.61 After the damage to the trees, 
“the house . . . [stood] in a field, rather than a forest.”62 Although the 
house itself suffered no damage, the court allowed a $20,000 casualty 
loss deduction, attributable to both “the lost trees and the overall 
reduction in the aesthetic value.”63 But the holding in this case is 
likely distinguishable from other Ninth Circuit64 cases because the 
taxpayer owned the home and the damaged adjacent lots, and the 
court found that the taxpayer’s lots “constitute[d] a single piece of 
property” for the purposes of determining the adjusted basis of the 
property.65 Applying this outcome to Deepwater Horizon victims 
would likely only result in limited recovery by property owners who 
own multiple, adjacent parcels of property. 
This distinction is particularly likely in light of a subsequent 
opinion in which the U.S. Tax Court reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit’s 
disallowance of deductions for a decline in property value. In 
Chamales v. Commissioner, the U.S. Tax Court did not follow the 
Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Finkbohner in assessing whether 
taxpayers suffered a casualty loss due to a decline in their home value 
in Brentwood, California, following the O.J. Simpson murder trial.66 
The court based its decision on the premise that the Ninth Circuit 
has “consistently held that an essential element of a deductible 
casualty loss is physical damage.”67 In dicta, the court said assuming 
arguendo that it did apply the Eleventh Circuit’s rule, the damage to 
the taxpayer’s property was “more akin to a fluctuation in value” 
than a “permanent devaluation . . . which no court has found to 
support a deduction under Section 165(c)(3).”68 The court disallowed 
 
61. Beams v. Comm’r, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3152 (1994).  
62. Id. at 3154. 
63. Id.  
64. The connection between the U.S. Tax Court and other federal courts is 
complex. In Golsen v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), the U.S. Tax Court 
held that “better judicial administration requires [the Tax Court] to 
follow a Court of Appeals decision which is squarely in point where 
appeal from [the Tax Court’s] decision lies to that Court of Appeals and 
to that court alone.” Id. at 757. Thus, because Beams, 67 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 3152, arose in California, and an appeal to the Tax Court’s 
decision would have gone to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
the Tax Court was bound by its holding in Golsen to follow Ninth 
Circuit precedent, at least in as much as it is clear that the issue in 
Beams is “squarely in point” with the issues addressed in other Ninth 
Circuit cases. Golsen, 54 T.C. at 757.  
65. Beams, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) at 3154. 
66. Chamales v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1428 (2003). 
67. Id. at 1433. 
68. Id.  
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the casualty loss deduction, and upheld the Ninth Circuit’s 
requirement of physical damage to support a valid casualty loss. 
It is hard to say whether a decline in property value due to the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill will materialize as a mere “fluctuation in 
value”69 or a “permanent devaluation,”70 but the disparate treatment 
of declines in property value is likely to result in inequitable outcomes 
to victims of the spill. Admittedly, this is one of the “gray areas” 
where it would be extremely difficult to draw a line: How much of a 
decline in value yields a casualty loss? Should there be an upper limit 
to the amount that a taxpayer can claim for this kind of casualty 
loss? How would this type of casualty loss interplay with the Tax 
Benefit Rule71 if, in fact, the decline in value is only a temporary 
fluctuation? The answers to these questions are beyond the scope of 
this Note, but the ambiguity inherent in this facet of casualty losses 
in the oil spill context underscores the need for a streamlined 
approach to maximize equity and efficiency of taxpayer recovery in 
the wake of this kind of disaster.  
III. A Flawed Framework: The Shortcomings of the 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the Gulf Coast Claims 
Facility, and Insurance  
The OPA, the GCCF, and insurance (both private and federally 
funded) are all ways in which victims of oil spill casualty losses can 
seek compensation for damage to their property. But these means of 
recovery are not consistently applied, resulting in stark consequences 
for taxpayers. Not all victims will recover their losses, and, even if 
they do recover, their recoveries could be inequitable, due to 
inconsistent judicial interpretations of legislation and ad hoc 
evaluations of casualty loss claims. Additionally, without a clear 
expectation of prospects for recovery, individuals claiming casualty 
loss deductions can encounter significant financial repercussions under 
the Tax Benefit Rule. These means of recovery certainly have their 
benefits, but there is a pressing need for a uniform system that 
incorporates these benefits to create a uniform scheme of 
compensating casualty loss victims. Gulf County, Florida, 
Commissioner Bill Williams said it best, in criticizing the Gulf Coast 
Claims Facility:  
In regards to claims in general, it would be our recommendation 
that Congress provide greater clarity and direction to this 
process. Probably the greatest frustration for everyone involved, 
 
69. Id.  
70. Id. 
71. See supra Part I (discussing the Tax Benefit Rule).  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 4·2013 
Casualty Loss Reform in the Wake of the Deepwater Horizon Disaster 
1377 
both private and public, were constant changes in the claims 
process. There were eight different policies, procedures, 
processes and applications within the first two months. The 
summer was almost over before our businesses and individuals 
finally had a solid process.72 
A. The OPA and the Problem of Judicial Interpretation 
The OPA73 is a statutory scheme developed in the aftermath of 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989. While it creates broad protections 
for victims of oil spills, its vague language, inadequate financial 
responsibility requirements, and flexibility leave much to judicial 
interpretation and chance. The OPA certainly goes a long way toward 
protecting oil spill victims, but it is by no means comprehensive. 
The OPA provides that the responsible party in an oil spill is 
strictly liable for removal costs caused by the spill,74 including “any 
removal costs incurred by any person for acts taken by the person 
which are consistent with the National Contingency Plan.”75 The 
OPA also includes a provision for private rights of action for damage 
to real or personal property stemming from an oil spill “incident,” 
defined in the OPA as “any occurrence or series of occurrences having 
the same origin, involving one or more vessels, facilities, or any 
combination thereof, resulting in the discharge or substantial threat of 
discharge of oil.”76 The OPA establishes a $75,000,000 cap on liability 
for other costs for an offshore facility.77 
One problem with the OPA is that despite the strict liability for 
cleanup and the private right of action, the way the statute defines 
“incident” seems to indicate that the incident “is therefore the 
occurrence (i.e. collision, grounding or explosion) which results in the 
oil spill, and not the spill itself.”78 The implications of this semantic 
 
72. Statement by Bill Williams, Gulf County Commissioner 
(Florida), to House Oversight & Government Reform Committee 
4 (June 2, 2011), available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/01/Bill_Williams_Testimony.pdf. 
73. 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006). 
74. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (“[E]ach responsible party for a vessel or a facility 
from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a 
discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining 
shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable for the removal costs 
and damages . . . that result from such incident.”).  
75.  33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(1)(B).  
76. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(14). 
77. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3). 
78. Thomas J. Wagner, Recoverable Damages under the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990, 5 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 283, 293 (1993). 
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distinction are best seen in the Fifth Circuit’s treatment of the issue 
in a pre-OPA case, Lloyd’s Leasing Ltd. v. Conoco.79  
In Lloyd’s Leasing Ltd., an oil tanker grounded off the coast of 
Louisiana and spilled 65,500 barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of 
Mexico.80 A group of plaintiffs “who suffered damages from oil tracked 
onto their premises by tourists and beachgoers” brought suit against 
the oil company.81 The plaintiffs’ property was damaged due to “the 
particular combination of tides and winds that existed at the time of 
the spill,” which caused oil to wash ashore approximately seventy 
miles from the grounding.82 The court found for the oil company, 
holding that the harm suffered by the plaintiffs was not foreseeable to 
the defendants, and that the defendants therefore owed no duty to 
the plaintiffs:  
While the appellee might reasonably anticipate that the oil 
would probably wash ashore somewhere, it had no reason to 
have anticipated that the oil would probably wash ashore in a 
heavily populated area and then be tracked into businesses and 
homes. “To be found liable a defendant must have knowledge of 
a danger, not merely possible but probable.”83  
The Fifth Circuit denied recovery since the damage was a result 
of unforeseeable consequences from the oil spill, not from the initial 
incident itself. By not providing clear parameters for recovery, the 
OPA does not guide interpretation of this issue. Writing about the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill, Thomas Wagner commented “one would infer 
that Congress intended to authorize property damages due to the 
spread of oil discharged in such an incident . . . [but i]f the 
recoverable damages need only relate to the spill (and not the 
originating incident), OPA provides no ‘outer limit’ to this remedy.”84  
An issue that has yet to arise is what would happen in the event 
that a hurricane caused the discharged oil to migrate to unexpected 
locations. A report from June 2010 offered probability statistics 
showing that at the time there was a 10 percent chance that a 
hurricane wind field could pass through the oil slick, and a 4 percent 
chance that the hurricane could be an intense, Category 3–5 
hurricane, “with a significant storm surge and the potential to carry 
 
79. Id. at 293 (citing Lloyd’s Leasing Ltd. v. Conoco, 868 F.2d 1447 (5th 
Cir. 1989)).  
80. Lloyd’s Leasing Ltd., 868 F.2d at 1448.  
81. Id.  
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 1449–50 (quoting Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. C.F. Bean 
Corp., 833 F.2d 65, 68 (11th Cir. 1987)). 
84. Wagner, supra note 78, at 294. 
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tar deposits far inland.”85 The same report stated that “any hurricane 
in the vicinity of the slick has the potential to bring waves that break 
protective booms and allow the oil to be displaced into coastal salt 
marshes and beaches above the tide line.”86 The National Flood 
Insurance Program covers oil damage to policyholders’ property as a 
result of floods, but as noted in Part III.C below, that program is not 
foolproof, and because time parameters have not been established 
around liability under the OPA, it is unclear whether all derivative 
damage from an oil spill would be covered under the statute.87 
While at first blush it would seem that the OPA provides 
adequate remedies to private individuals who are victims of oil spills, 
the ambiguity in the plain words of the OPA indicates a pressing 
need for clearly defined, streamlined remedies for individuals whose 
real or personal property is damaged as a result of a spill. 
B. The Gulf Coast Claims Facility and the Decline in Private Causes 
of Action: Problems of Timing, Discretion, and Ad Hoc Evaluations 
In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, President Obama 
and BP negotiated to create a system for BP to address victims’ 
claims for costs and damages incurred as a result of the spill. BP set 
aside a twenty-billion-dollar fund and established the GCCF to 
administer payments to those seeking restitution. The GCCF was 
established to supplement the OPA recovery process, and the fund 
that BP allocated was generous. But since it was created outside of a 
legislative framework, there are no checks and balances, and the fund 
is so new that the system is being defined and administered in an 
impromptu way. This lack of accountability is particularly 
troublesome since one of the goals of the GCCF is to decrease the 
instances of private causes of action. The GCCF has the potential to 
provide victims with relief, but its standards and procedures need to 
be more narrowly defined.  
Tort remedies are available to victims of the spill, but as GCCF 
administrator Kenneth Feinberg has said,  
[U]nder [the GCCF], you will receive, if you’re eligible, 
compensation without having to go to court for years, without 
the uncertainty of going to court, since I’ll be much more 
generous than any court will be . . . . And at the same time, 
you won’t need to pay lawyers and costs.88  
 
85. Robert Muir-Wood, The Macondo, Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill: 
Insurance Implications 4 (2010).  
86. Id. 
87. See infra Part III.C (discussing the National Flood Insurance Program). 
88. Frederic J. Frommer, Administrator Has To ‘Sell’ BP Victims on 
Money, Associated Press (July 19, 2010, 1:53 PM), http://www.nbcnews 
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He added that those interested in seeking a tort remedy for their 
damages would be “crazy to do so.”89 In fact, BP and the GCCF have 
made free legal assistance available for those filing claims with the 
GCCF.90 But for those who choose not to utilize the free legal 
assistance, “[d]amages for claims for . . . Damage to Real or Personal 
Property . . . include the reasonable cost of estimating the damages 
claimed, but not attorney’s fees or administrative costs associated 
with preparation of the claim.”91 This effectively discourages private 
causes of action by individuals for whom legal fees would be cost 
prohibitive. 
The GCCF stated in its first anniversary report that it has 
consistently acted with “Efficiency and Speed”:  
On this first year anniversary date, the GCCF has “processed” 
virtually all of the 947,892 claims submitted by claimants; the 
majority of claims remaining are those submitted during the 
past two–three months and those that have not provided 
sufficient documentation to resolve the claim.92 
But those statistics do not paint the full picture. Immediately 
after the oil spill, there was an “interim solution designed to provide 
 
.com/id/38311190/ns/business-oil_and_energy/t/administrator-has-sell-bp-
victims-money/. 
89. Id. 
90. BDO Consulting, Independent Evaluation of the Gulf Coast 
Claims Facility: Report of Finding & Observations to the U.S. 
Department of Justice 28 (2012) (“The GCCF informed us that, from 
its inception, it attempted to arrange for a process by which claimants 
would be able to receive free legal assistance. . . . [T]he GCCF entered 
into an agreement with the Mississippi Center for Justice, a nonprofit, 
public interest law firm, to oversee a consortium of legal services providers 
in the Gulf region that provided legal assistance to all claimants who 
sought it, regardless of income level. By its terms, the agreement stated 
that it was not imposing ‘any limitations on the professional judgment of 
legal services providers, including the ability to advise clients that they 
should reject a GCCF settlement offer and instead seek compensation 
from the NPFC or other oil spill fund, commence litigation, or take any 
other actions.’ ”).  
91. Id. Exhibit P, at 5. One attorney reported that he “charges spill victims 
a 10% fee plus 2% of his costs.” David Bario, Oil and Water: Plaintiffs’ 
Lawyers are Splitting Over the Performance of Kenneth Feinberg and 
BP’s Fund for Oil-Spill Victims, Nat’l L.J. & Legal Times, Mar. 7, 
2011, at 1. 
92. Gulf Coast Claims Facility, The Gulf Coast Claims Facility 
After Its First Year of Operation 3 (2011).  
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immediate relief to individuals and smaller businesses.”93 Payouts 
were made in thirty-day increments and tended to be small, while the 
claims process was streamlined.94 In January 2011, there were reports 
that the victims, “due to their desperation . . . [were] accept[ing] 
much smaller ‘quick-pay’ settlements that require[d] granting BP PLC 
and other oil-spill defendants full release from future lawsuits.”95 It is 
clear that although the GCCF and BP fund have been very successful 
in distributing funds to victims, the system is imperfect. 
By discouraging private causes of action, the GCCF lowers 
transaction costs for individuals and for BP in adjudicating claims 
and compensating victims. The creation of the GCCF was a boon to 
Deepwater Horizon victims, since the OPA caps liability for any spill 
at $75,000,000. But payouts were not uniform, the timeframe for 
recovery has been unclear, and victims have been willing to take lower 
payments in return for quicker settlements. The system is fraught 
with issues of inequitable treatment and lacks the kind of uniformity 
needed to address the needs of taxpayers with casualty losses 
following major oil spills.  
C.  Homeowner’s Insurance and the National Flood Insurance 
Program: Inadequacy of Coverage in the Wake of Oil Spills  
Insurance is an alternative avenue of recovery for oil spill victims, 
albeit a limited one. First of all, private homeowner’s insurance by 
and large does not cover damage from oil spills.96 But flood insurance 
does. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) oversees 
the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).97 The NFIP offers 
flood insurance, reduces flood damage through floodplain management 
 
93. Alfred R. Light, Designing the Gulf Coast Claims Facility in the Shadow 
of the Law: A Template from the Superfund § 301(e) Report, 40 Envtl. 
L. Rep. News & Analysis 11121, 11122 (2010).  
94. Id. 
95. Bario, supra note 91, at 1–4.  
96. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Catastrophic Oil Spills and the Problem of 
Insurance, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 1769, 1773 (2011) (“Homeowners policies 
are issued to the owners of residential property to cover the risk of 
direct physical loss to property. Most pollution damage affecting 
homeowners, however, would not be covered by such policies. The 
standard-form homeowners policy, for example, excludes coverage of loss 
to covered property caused by ‘the discharge, dispersal, seepage, 
migration, release or escape of pollutants’ unless the discharge, etc., is 
itself the result of one of a number of named perils or causes. The only 
named cause of loss that might result in pollution is ‘explosion.’ But few 
spills are caused by explosions or by any of the other named ‘perils’ that 
are exceptions to the exclusions in a homeowners policy, including the 
pollution exclusion.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
97. Daniel A. Farber et al., Disaster Law and Policy 311 (2010).  
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regulations, and identifies and maps American floodplains, creating 
“broad-based awareness of the flood hazards and provid[ing] the data 
needed for floodplain management programs and to actuarially rate 
new construction for flood insurance.”98 Although this federally funded 
flood insurance is widely available,99 it is elective.100 Congress enacted 
the NFIP to remedy deficiencies in the flood insurance market, and 
property owners in communities that adopt and enforce the criteria 
set forth by the NFIP may buy into the insurance program.101 
Perhaps most importantly, the NFIP subsidizes the insuring owners of 
“existing buildings” that were constructed prior to the enactment of 
NFIP or prior to a community’s adoption of NFIP.102 
A widely voiced concern in the months following the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster was the possibility of oil contamination of property 
due to flooding during hurricane season.103 FEMA Claims Director 
James Sadler issued a memorandum on June 7, 2010, stating that as 
long as there is a defined flood, “[d]amage caused by the oil in flood 
waters is covered subject to the provisions of the [NFIP].”104 But the 
NFIP limits the amount recoverable for damage caused by pollutants 
to $10,000, and damage “to ground, soil, or land caused by flood, oil, 
 
98. Id. at 311–12 (quoting FEMA, National Flood Insurance 
Program: Program Description 2 (Aug. 1, 2002)). 
99. Id. at 311 (“Over 19,700 communities presently participate in the NFIP. 
These include nearly all communities with significant flood hazards.” 
(quoting FEMA, supra note 98, at 2)). 
100. Id. at 312 (“Section 1304 of the 1968 Act authorizes the Director of 
FEMA to establish and carry out ‘a national flood insurance program 
which will enable interested persons to purchase insurance against loss 
resulting from physical damage to or loss of real property or personal 
property.’” (quoting FEMA, supra note 98, at 22)). 
101. Id. (citing FEMA, supra note 98, at 22) 
102. Id. (quoting FEMA, supra note 98, at 2).  
103. See, e.g., Richard Rainey, Flood Insurance Will Cover Oil Damage, but 
Only to Buildings, Nola.com (June 2, 2010, 8:59 PM) 
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/06/flood_insura 
nce_will_cover_oil.html (explaining how flood insurance will work in 
the event that flood waters carry oil).  
104. Memorandum from James A. Sadler, Claims Director, FEMA, to  Write 
Your Own Principal Coordinators and the National Flood Insurance 
Program Servicing Agent 1 (June 7, 2010) [hereinafter Sadler 
Memorandum], available at http://www.nfipiservice.com/pdf/bulletin/w 
-10065a.pdf. FEMA defines “flood” as “a general and temporary 
condition of partial or complete inundation of two or more acres of 
normally dry land area or two or more properties . . . at least one of 
which is the policyholder’s property . . . from: overflow of inland or tidal 
waters[,] unusual and rapid accumulation of runoff or surface waters 
from any source[, or] mudflow.” Id. at 2. 
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or flood water mixed with oil is not covered.”105 Ground 
contamination is likely covered through the OPA,106 but the taxpayer 
would have to submit a claim to both the NFIP and to the claims 
facility organized under the OPA (the GCCF, for Deepwater Horizon 
victims) to be compensated. When a taxpayer accepts a payment 
from the NFIP, the taxpayer subrogates his or her right to recover 
payment from the party responsible for the oil spill to FEMA. And 
“[i]f the policyholder makes a claim against an entity who caused a 
loss and recovers any money, the policyholder must pay FEMA . . . 
back before they may keep any of the money.”107 
This is obviously problematic. The taxpayer pays for flood 
insurance that covers only damage to his or her dwelling. The 
taxpayer has to submit one claim to the NFIP for that damage and a 
separate claim under the OPA to cover the costs of cleaning up the 
contaminated land. When the taxpayer is compensated by the party 
responsible for the oil spill, either through the OPA or a fund like the 
GCCF, the taxpayer then has to determine what portion of that 
compensation must be returned to FEMA under the NFIP. Two 
systems designed to assist victims offer disjointed recovery and result 
in added time and expense as the taxpayer determines the portion of 
the recoveries to which he or she is entitled. There must be an easier 
way.  
IV. The Stafford Act and § 165(h)(3)(c): Applying the 
Casualty Loss Provisions for Victims of Federally 
Declared Disasters to Victims of Oil Spills  
The Code has specific provisions108 for victims of federally 
declared disasters—provisions that are triggered when the President 
of the United States invokes the Stafford Act.109 Among other  
105. Id.  
106. A provision in the OPA makes the party responsible for the oil spill 
strictly liable for removal costs and damages. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a)–(b) 
(2006). 
107. Sadler Memorandum, supra note 104, at 2. 
108. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 165(i)(1) (2006) (“[A]ny loss attributable to a disaster 
occurring in an area subsequently determined by the President of the 
United States to warrant assistance by the Federal Government under 
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 
may, at the election of the taxpayer, be taken into account for the 
taxable year immediately preceding the taxable year in which the 
disaster occurred.”); I.R.C. § 165(k) (describing the procedure for 
treatment as a disaster loss where the taxpayer is required to relocate or 
demolish his or her residence because of a Stafford Act disaster 
declaration).  
109. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207 (2006).  
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provisions, the Code allows disaster victims to elect to take their 
casualty loss for either the year of the loss or the preceding year.110 
Additionally, Congress has in certain instances made special tax 
provisions for victims of federally declared disasters111 under the 
Stafford Act. The Stafford Act “authorizes the President to issue 
major disaster or emergency declarations in response to catastrophes 
in the United States that overwhelm state and local governments.”112 
In the wake of Deepwater Horizon, and in anticipation of future oil 
spills, Congress could use the Code to bolster insufficient insurance 
payouts or compensation from oil spill funds like the GCCF.113 This 
could be done with or without invoking the Stafford Act; however, 
Congress’s recent actions easing the Code’s casualty loss restrictions 
have been done in conjunction with the Stafford Act, so it seems 
likely that Congress would restrict its action to federally declared 
Stafford Act disasters. The provisions already in the Code also 
indicate that special tax treatment should be reserved for Stafford Act 
disasters. Invoking the Stafford Act in response to the Deepwater 
Horizon accident or other oil spills would be inappropriate, given the 
Stafford Act’s statutory requirements, but the casualty loss 
allowances in the Code and that Congress has made in the past 
should be extended to oil spill victims. 
Under the Stafford Act, major disasters are restricted to natural 
catastrophes, including storms, earthquakes, and floods, as well as 
fires, floods, and explosions, regardless of the cause.114 After a natural 
catastrophe occurs, the governor of the affected state requests a major 
 
110. I.R.C. § 165(i)(1). 
111. See, e.g., Molly F. Sherlock et al., Cong. Research Serv., 
R 41323, Tax Issues and the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill: Legal 
Analysis of Payments and Tax Relief Policy Options 10 (2010), 
available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41323.pdf (“The Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 . . . temporarily changes some of the 
rules associated with claiming casualty losses for taxpayers in federally 
declared disaster areas. For the 2008 and 2009 tax years, (1) all 
taxpayers, including non-itemizers, could claim a disaster loss deduction; 
(2) the 10% AGI limitation on disaster losses was suspended; (3) a five-
year NOL carryback was available for disaster losses . . . ; and (4) the 
amount by which individual taxpayers were required to reduce their 
personal casualty losses per event was increased from $100 to $500 for 
deductions claimed in 2009.” (citing Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765)). 
112. Francis X. McCarthy, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33053, Federal 
Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, 
Eligible Activities, and Funding (Summary) (2011). 
113. See Sherlock et al., supra note 111, at 8 (“From an economic 
perspective, tax relief may be justified as achieving distributional 
objectives or addressing market failures.”). 
114. McCarthy, supra note 112, at 1 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5121(2) (2006)). 
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disaster declaration, and the President has three options: issue a 
major disaster declaration, issue an emergency declaration, or decline 
the request.115 Issuing an emergency or major disaster declaration 
under the Stafford Act allows for rapid and flexible FEMA 
assistance116: 
Emergency declarations trigger aid that protects property, 
public health, and safety and lessens or averts the threat of an 
incident becoming a catastrophic event. A major disaster 
declaration, issued after a catastrophe occurs, constitutes 
broader authority for federal agencies to provide supplemental 
assistance to help state and local governments, families and 
individuals, and certain nonprofit organizations recover from the 
incident.117 
Issuing a major catastrophe or emergency declaration in response 
to the Deepwater Horizon disaster could have created redundancy 
issues, since the disaster is already being addressed under the Oil 
Pollution Act.118 A larger issue is the availability of tort remedies 
following a Stafford Act declaration. After the Exxon Valdez oil spill 
in 1989, the President turned down the governor of Alaska’s requests 
for a Stafford Act declaration out of a concern that “a declaration by 
the President would hinder the government’s litigation against Exxon 
that promised substantial compensation for the incident.”119 An 
attorney for FEMA explained,  
The Department of Justice opposed a declaration of disaster by 
then-President George H. W. Bush on the basis that it might 
impact adversely the case of the United States against 
Exxon. . . . Acting General Counsel of FEMA, George Watson, 
said . . . that he had issued a legal opinion stating that no 
declaration of an oil spill could be made under the Stafford 
Act. . . . FEMA’s congressional liaison [issued a statement 
concluding] that where a parallel statutory scheme offered both 
compensation and better litigation rights to the United States 
than the Stafford Act, then the president would not declare a 
disaster or emergency.120 
 
115. Id. at 10.  
116. Francis X. McCarthy, Cong. Research Serv., R 41234, Potential 
Stafford Act Declarations for the Gulf Coast Oil Spill: 
Issues for Congress (2010).  
117. Id. at 1. 
118. Id. (Summary). 
119. Id. (Summary). 
120. Id. at 3 (quoting William R. Cumming, Letter to the Editor, 33 Nat. 
Hazards Observer, Jan. 2009, at 22, 22). 
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In addition to these obstacles, the fact that BP created the fund 
and established the GCCF means that there is not a pressing need for 
a disaster or emergency declaration under the Stafford Act. 
Additionally, one of the goals of the Stafford Act is “encouraging 
individuals, States, and local governments to protect themselves by 
obtaining insurance coverage to supplement or replace government 
assistance.”121 But one of the overarching goals of the Stafford Act is 
“providing Federal assistance programs for both public and private 
losses sustained in disasters.”122 Congress’s legislation in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina—dropping the 10 percent AGI requirement for 
casualty losses—helped achieve this goal by allowing more people to 
recover their losses; provisions in the Code that are triggered by the 
Stafford Act allow individuals to claim a casualty loss in the actual 
year of the loss or the preceding year, creating more financial 
flexibility for victims. While the OPA creates a parallel statutory 
scheme and redundancy issues, and while there is always an inherent 
moral hazard in the casualty loss provision of the Code, these 
problems do not outweigh the broader issue that the current 
framework for recovery by individual oil spill victims is not 
streamlined enough to provide guaranteed, uniform recovery. The 
justifications for the Stafford Act and for additional legislation passed 
by Congress to bolster the tax allowances triggered by the Stafford 
Act are equally applicable to the oil spill context, and can be used to 
support a uniform statutory scheme to allow victims of casualty losses 
to fully recover in the wake of an oil spill. 
V. Reducing Transaction Costs and Streamlining the 
System Through IRS Subrogation 
Thus far, this Note has made several observations: Oil spills are 
casualties within the meaning of Code section 165(c).123 Without a 
clear framework for recovery, taxpayers contemporaneously seeking 
casualty loss deductions from the IRS and recoveries from the 
responsible party have the potential to suffer the adverse effects of the 
Tax Benefit Rule.124 In the oil spill context, the Eleventh Circuit’s 
holding that a decline in property value absent physical damage 
constitutes a casualty loss needs to be adopted, over the Ninth 
Circuit’s objections, either congressionally or judicially.125 The OPA, 
 
121. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b)(4) (2006). 
122. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b)(6). 
123. See discussion supra Part I (discussing mechanics and application of 
I.R.C. § 165(c)(3)). 
124. See discussion supra Part I (discussing the Tax Benefit Rule).  
125. See discussion supra Part II (discussing circuit split between the United 
States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits). 
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GCCF, homeowner’s insurance, and the NFIP do not offer sufficient 
protection to the victims of oil spills, and are sometimes even in 
conflict.126 Oil spills are not disasters within the meaning of the 
Stafford Act, but the legislative framework of the Stafford Act and 
Congress’s post-Hurricane Katrina tax legislation ought to be applied 
to the oil spill context.127 And the current state of affairs for oil spill 
casualty losses is disjointed and inefficient. There are, no doubt, 
countless ways to address the shortcomings of the current system, but 
this Note proposes one solution: IRS subrogation, with an adoption of 
the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that property value decline constitutes 
a casualty loss, a removal of the Code section 165(h) floors, and an 
adoption of the Code section 165(i) election provision, allowing 
recovery to all taxpayers victimized by an oil spill casualty. 
Subrogation is defined as “[t]he substitution of one party for 
another whose debt the party pays, entitling the paying party to 
rights, remedies, or securities that would otherwise belong to the 
debtor.”128 A party is subrogated to the rights of another “when the 
first party steps into the second party’s shoes . . . and assumes the 
second party’s rights against a third party.”129 There are three types 
of subrogation: equitable, contractual, and statutory. Equitable, or 
legal, subrogation “arises by operation of law,”130 and “is a creature of 
equity; is enforced solely for the purpose of accomplishing the ends of 
substantial justice; and is independent of any contractual relations 
between parties.”131 Courts have laid out different standards to invoke 
the doctrine of equitable subrogation. A typical formulation of the 
elements of equitable subrogation is 
(1) the party claiming subrogation has paid the debt; (2) the 
party was not a volunteer, but had a direct interest in the 
discharge of the debt or lien; (3) the party was secondarily 
 
126. See discussion supra Part III (discussing the OPA, GCCF, and 
insurance).  
127. See discussion supra Part IV (discussing the Stafford Act). 
128. Black’s Law Dictionary 1563–64 (9th ed. 2009).  
129. Kenneth S. Abraham, Insurance Law and Regulation 274 (5th 
ed. 2010) (“For example, suppose that the insured’s home is destroyed 
by a fire negligently set by her neighbor, and the . . . insurer pays the 
insured the amount of the loss. The insurer is then entitled to recover 
this amount from the neighbor, either directly in a suit against the 
neighbor (in what would be called ‘active’ subrogation), or as the real 
party in interest in a suit brought by the insured, through a right to be 
reimbursed out of the proceeds of such a suit (in what might be called 
‘passive’ subrogation.)”).  
130. Id. 
131. Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 136 n.12 (1962) (quoting 
Memphis & L.R.R. Co. v. Dow, 120 U.S. 287, 301–02 (1887)).  
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liable for the debt or for the discharge of the lien; and (4) no 
injustice will be done to the other party by the allowance of the 
equity.132 
Contractual, or conventional, subrogation “results from an agreement 
of the parties,”133 and usually takes the form of a subrogation clause 
in a contract. Statutory subrogation is codified in a state’s insurance 
legislation.134 
The federal government, too, has statutory subrogation rights.135 
For example, the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act136 gives the 
United States government the “right to reimbursement as [a] subrogee 
to third-party tort claims of certain individuals, such as military 
personnel and their dependents, who receive free medical or dental 
care.”137 Likewise, there is a Medicare provision under which the 
“United States is subrogated to any right of an individual or entity to 
payment with respect to [an] item or service when Medicare is [the] 
primary plan.”138 The NFIP gives FEMA subrogation rights for oil 
spill damage when an insured receives a financial recovery from a 
responsible party.139 President Obama submitted a legislative package 
to Congress outlining a similar approach for unemployment funds, 
requiring that BP “reimburse the government for unemployment 
wages paid to the individual while the individual’s claim is being 
processed.”140 Supplemental nutrition assistance and commodity 
distributions to victims likewise would have been charged to BP 
 
132. Pharmacists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 658 F. Supp. 2d 745, 
749 n.3 (D.S.C. 2009) (quoting Kuznik v. Bees Ferry Assoc., 538 S.E.2d 
15, 30 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000)).  
133. Abraham, supra note 129, at 274. 
134. See, e.g., Robert H. Jerry II & Douglas R. Richmond, 
Understanding Insurance Law 680 (4th ed. 2007) (“[I]t is common 
for statutes to create, limit, or prohibit subrogation with respect to 
uninsured, underinsured, first-party medical, and no-fault coverages.”).  
135. See id. at 681 n.117 (using the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act as 
an example of a federal statute giving subrogation rights to the federal 
government). 
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2651 (2006).  
137. Jerry & Richmond, supra note 134, at 681 n.117. 
138. Id. 
139. See discussion supra Part III.C (discussing NFIP subrogation); note 112 
and accompanying text (noting that the damage caused by oil in flood 
waters is covered by NFIP). 
140. Press Release, White House Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill Legislative Package (May 12, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-sheet-deepwater-
horizon-oil-spill-legislative-package.  
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under the proposed legislative package.141 Statutory subrogation is 
nothing new for the United States government, and in the context of 
casualty losses from the Deepwater Horizon disaster, it could provide 
a workable solution to lower transaction costs and ensure that victims 
are adequately compensated for their losses. 
The OPA includes a section on subrogation of claims,142 providing 
that “[a]ny person . . . who pays compensation pursuant to this Act 
to any claimant for removal costs or damages shall be subrogated to 
all rights, claims, and causes of action that the claimant has under 
any other law.”143 This subrogation clause is expansive enough that it 
could include the IRS. 
By implementing subrogation, the IRS “could aim to recover the 
amount of tax revenue lost directly because of the deduction taken by 
the tort victim.”144 In an article proposing subrogation of section 165 
casualty loss deductions, Andrew Blair-Stanek proposes three methods 
by which the IRS could implement subrogation. In the absence of 
statutory authority, he suggests first that the IRS could “issue 
regulations giving itself the power to pursue subrogation rights and 
hope that courts find these regulations worthy of the relevant level of 
deference.”145 Second, the IRS could, as an alternative, “simply claim 
equitable subrogation rights.”146 He notes that courts would likely be 
unsympathetic to these two approaches,147 and he is probably correct. 
It is difficult to say how an individual court would reasonably 
interpret the Internal Revenue Code. Equitable subrogation is “an 
equitable right whereby a nonvolunteer who is secondarily liable for 
and pays a third party’s debt succeeds to the creditor’s rights against 
that third party.”148 The IRS would be a volunteer in this situation 
and would not be secondarily liable. 
His third suggestion is statutory subrogation: “[S]ubrogation 
would probably require congressional authorization, which could also 
address procedural details such as venue, notice, available defenses, 
the effect of contractual waivers, and the deductibility of a 
tortfeasor’s payments to a prevailing IRS.”149 This is the most realistic 
 
141. Id.  
142. 33 U.S.C. § 2715 (2006).  
143. 33 U.S.C. § 2715(a). 
144. Blair-Stanek, supra note 15, at 342.  
145. Id. at 343.  
146. Id. 
147. See id. (“[C]ourts would likely hesitate to find a subrogation right in a 
reasonable interpretation of the statute.”). 
148. Jerry & Richmond, supra note 134, at 680.  
149. Blair-Stanek, supra note 15, at 343–44. 
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of his three proposals. For one thing, congressional action permitted 
the elimination of section 165(h) floors following Hurricane Katrina. 
This precedent for alleviating strains on taxpayers following major 
crises indicates that Congress might be willing to make similar 
adjustments based on public policy considerations in the oil spill 
context. 
There would likely be three main arguments against implementing 
IRS subrogation in this context. First, the administrative costs to the 
IRS would be high. The IRS would have to set up a system to 
monitor and evaluate claims, and maybe even set up an auditing 
system. The current system could, however, be tweaked to allow for 
this new framework: 
When taking § 165 deductions, taxpayers currently must fill out 
a form listing each property damaged, along with insurance 
information, date acquired, and fair market values. It would not 
be difficult to require brief information about the cause of the 
loss. This information would allow the IRS to perform a quick 
cost-benefit analysis and decide whether to pursue its 
subrogation rights.150 
After allowing the casualty loss deduction, the IRS would then sue 
the tortfeasor to recover the lost revenue.151 If successful, the taxpayer 
has received the deduction, and the IRS has recovered lost revenue 
from allowing the deduction. Granted, there would be a transaction 
cost to the IRS in enforcing its subrogation rights that would not be 
covered by a favorable outcome to such a lawsuit. The OPA offers a 
solution to this problem: 
The Fund shall be available to the President for . . . the 
payment of Federal administrative, operational, and personnel 
costs and expenses reasonably necessary for and incidental to 
the implementation, administration, and enforcement of this 
Act . . . with respect to prevention, removal, and enforcement 
related to oil discharges . . . .152 
 
150. Id. at 343. 
151. Blair-Stanek proposes that, at this point, “the victim will probably often 
join the lawsuit to vindicate her full rights . . . [and] the IRS could 
simply leave the suit. Should the victim recover, the taxpayer would lose 
the deduction, thereby restoring the Treasury to the same position as if 
it had won on its own.” Id. at 344. While this point is well taken, it 
arguably defeats the purpose of lowering transaction costs to individual 
taxpayers. A more efficient approach may be to have the casualty loss 
deduction be the final mode of recovery for a taxpayer in this situation.  
152. 33 U.S.C. § 2712(a)–(a)(5) (2006).  
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It remains to be seen whether the President could or would utilize 
funds under the OPA to compensate the IRS for a subrogation 
program for casualty losses to individuals, but there is statutory 
framework in place to support such a decision.  
The second criticism to this approach is that low-income 
taxpayers do not benefit as much from an income tax deduction as 
high-income taxpayers. A solution to this problem could be to provide 
a casualty loss credit instead of a casualty loss deduction. The 
feasibility of this option is beyond the scope of this Note, but it is 
certainly an option worth considering, because a “refundable tax 
credit would provide a more equitable benefit across income levels.”153 
A suggestion for limiting this kind of taxpayer recovery is to limit the 
credit to “a fixed amount, which would limit compensation for 
taxpayers with higher uninsured losses.”154 But this kind of limitation 
could cause run-ins with the insurance issues discussed in Part III.C. 
The framework and feasibility of such a program would need to be 
explored further, prior to implementation.  
The third criticism questions why the section 165(i) Stafford Act 
election provision should apply, and why the 165(h) floors should be 
removed in this context at all. But “tax relief may be justified as 
achieving distributional objectives or addressing market failures. 
Market failures occur when resources are not efficiently allocated due 
to unpriced costs or benefits.”155 Market failures following an oil spill 
like Deepwater Horizon include imperfections in the statutory 
framework of the OPA, imperfections in the existing insurance 
options, and the unchartered territory of the GCCF. “From this 
perspective, the nation broadly shares the risk of large-scale disasters 
by providing federal relief where insurance markets are incomplete.”156 
While BP is expected to compensate individuals for losses, thus 
weighing against an argument for reduced tax liability to Deepwater 
Horizon victims, the systemic flaws of the GCCF, OPA, and 
insurance discussed in Part III indicate that a different framework is 
necessary to uniformly compensate taxpayers who are in need. 
Streamlining the recovery process by dropping the floors to allow 
more widespread recovery, and allowing the taxpayer to choose the 
year in which to claim the casualty loss deduction to “accelerate the 
benefit associated with the loss deduction during a time of need,”157 
reduces a taxpayer’s recovery process to making one claim, on his or 
 
153. Sherlock et al., supra note 111, at 10.  
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 8.  
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 10. 
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her tax return, instead of jumping through the hoops of the private 
insurance, the NFIP, the OPA, and the GCCF. 
Conclusion  
The current system of casualty loss compensation for taxpayers 
victimized by oil spills like the Deepwater Horizon disaster is flawed. 
This Note’s proposal—IRS subrogation of casualty loss claims coupled 
with the adoption of Code section 165(i) Stafford Act election and an 
elimination of the Code section 165(h) floors—is by no means perfect 
either. But ideas like this are a step in the right direction toward 
providing a streamlined, equitable system of taxpayer recovery for 
casualty losses in the wake of future oil spills.  
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